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Abstract
We develop a simple stock selection model to explain why active equity managers
tend to underperform a benchmark index. We motivate our model with the empirical
observation that the best performing stocks in a broad market index often perform
much better than the other stocks in the index. Randomly selecting a subset of se-
curities from the index may dramatically increase the chance of underperforming the
index. The relative likelihood of underperformance by investors choosing active man-
agement likely is much more important than the loss those same investors take due to
the higher fees of active management relative to passive index investing. Thus, active
management may be even more challenging than previously believed, and the stakes
for finding the best active managers may be larger than previously assumed.
Key words: Indexing, Passive Management, Active Management
∗Conjecture LLC, jb@conjecturellc.com
†Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, ngp@chicagobooth.edu
‡Department of Mathematics, University College London, and Conjecture LLC, jhw@conjecturellc.com
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
03
55
0v
3 
 [q
-fi
n.P
M
]  
14
 Ja
n 2
01
8
1 Introduction
The tendency of active equity managers to underperform a passive benchmark index (e.g.,
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Gruber (1996)) is something of a mystery. It is one
thing for active equity managers to fail to beat the benchmark index, since that may imply
only a lack of skill to do better than random selection. It is quite another to find that active
equity managers very often fail to keep up with the benchmark index, since that implies that
active equity managers are doing something that systematically leads to underperformance.
We develop a simple stock selection model that builds on the underemphasized empirical
fact that the best performing stocks in a broad index often perform much better than the
other stocks in the index, so that average index returns depend heavily on a relatively small
set of winners (e.g., J.P. Morgan (2014)). In our model, randomly selecting a small subset
of securities from an index maximizes the chance of outperforming the index - the allure of
active equity management - but it also maximizes the chance of underperforming the index,
with the chance of underperformance being larger than the chance of overperformance. To
illustrate the idea, consider an index of five securities, four of which (though it is unknown
which) will return 10% over the relevant period and one of which will return 50%. Suppose
that active managers choose portfolios of one or two securities and that they equally-weight
each investment. There are 15 possible one or two security “portfolios.” Of these 15, 10 will
earn returns of 10%, because they will include only the 10% securities. Just 5 of the 15
portfolios will include the 50% winner, earning 30% if part of a two security portfolio and
50% if it is the single security in a one security portfolio. The mean average return for all
possible actively-managed portfolios will be 18%, while the median portfolio of all possible
one- and two-stock portfolios will earn 10%. The equally-weighted index of all 5 securities
will earn 18%. Thus, in this example, the average active-management return will be the
same as the index (see Sharpe (1991)), but two-thirds of the actively-managed portfolios
will underperform the index because they will omit the 50% winner.
In this example, it is a large positive skewness in returns that creates a problem for active
management, illustrated here as the selection of one or two securities. The non-symmetric
shape of the distribution of returns means that random selection - which we might think
of as a plausible lower bound on the quality of active management - will deliver a median
return that is worse than the average of the full index of the securities.
In reality, the histrogram of returns to the securities in an index will change year-to-year.
Our model presents this as a problem of skewness, but our point is more general. One reason
indexing “works” so well is that, on average it seems, active management faces a higher hurdle
than previously recognized. Missing (or underweighting) the securities that significantly
outperform other securities is a strong headwind for an active manager to overcome. This
view of the active-passive problem helps us understand the mystery of how so many smart
people, with enormous financial and informational resources, systematically do such a poor
job investing money.
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Our paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we develop our simple stock selection model
and comment on relationships with sets of empirical data. In Section 3, we present a Monte
Carlo simulation of our model. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Stock Selection from an Index
We consider a benchmark index that contains N stocks Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Let the dynamics of
stock Si over time t ∈ [0, T ] be given by a geometric Brownian motion
dSit+1
Sit
= µi dt+ σ dWt,
where for simplicity we consider the volatility σ > 0 to be constant for all stocks. We assume
that stock drifts are distributed µi ∼ N(µˆ, σˆ2), which generates a small number of extreme
winners, a small number of extreme losers, and a large number of stocks with drifts centered
around µˆ with standard deviation σˆ > 0. While our model implies unpriced covariance
among securities and a lack of learning, much theory and evidence suggests that the learning
problem is too difficult over the lifetimes of most investors to pay much attention to that
modeling limitation (e.g., Merton (1980), Jobert, Platania, and Rogers (2006)).1 In any
case, our main goal is to generate a set of returns that - like we often see empirically - have
a set of winners that significantly outperforms other members of the index.
For simplicity, we assume that individual stocks maintain their drift µi over the time
period t ∈ [0, T ]. We also assume that individual stocks have a starting value Si0 = 1 for all
stocks.
If at time t = 0 we pick a stock Si0 at random, then our time T value follows
SiT ∼ eµˆT−
1
2
σ2T+
√
σ2T+σˆ2T 2Z ,
where Z ∼ N(0, 1), provided we assume µi and WT are independent.
We define an index return by the equally weighted portfolio
INt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Sit ,
which corresponds to a capital weighted index of N stocks.
1In one study of stock market fluctuations, Barsky and DeLong (1993) discuss the problem of estimating a
particular parameter for an assumed dividend process, noting that a Bayesian updater might not be shifted
significantly from his prior after 120 years of data and that “[e]ven if we were lucky and could precisely
estimate [the parameter], no investor in 1870 or 1929-lacking the data that we possess-had any chance of
doing so.”
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Two observations are apparent. First, the cumulative return of a stock picked randomly
at time t = 0 follows a log-N(µˆT − 1
2
σ2T, σ2T + σˆ2T 2) distribution. The variance component
σˆ2T 2, which indicates the over-proportional profit a continuously compounded winner will
bring relative to the loss incurred by a loser. That is, the distribution is heavily positively
skewed with a mean of eµˆT+
1
2
σˆ2T 2 . Second, the median of the stock distribution is given by
eµˆT−
1
2
σ2T , so that over time T more than half of all stocks in the index will underperform
the index return INT by a factor of e
1
2
σ2T+ 1
2
σˆ2T 2 .
Figure 1: On the left, overlapping frequencies of over- and underperformance relative to index average
return of 50%. On the right, overlapping frequencies of 20% over- and underperformance relative to index
average return 50%. While random selection of small sub-portfolios has the greatest probability of getting
overperformance, it also risks a relatively high probability of underperformance. The risk of substantial index
underperformance always dominates the chance of substantial index outperformance and is greatest for small
portfolios.
Another interpretation is that a geometric Brownian motion
St = S0 exp
(
µt− 1
2
σ2t
)
exp (σBt)
has first moment E(St) = S0eµt and mode S0eµt−
1
2
σ2t . By the strong law of large numbers,
for any  > 0, P (−t < Bt < t)→ 1 as t→∞. Therefore, for large enough values of t,
e−t < S0e−γt < et where γ = µ− 1
2
σ2.
Counter intuitively, the realised stock value is no where near its mean, as the growth rate
γ = µ − 1
2
σ2  µ. Clearly, it is the median that governs the long run. For example, a
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Figure 2: This chart can be found on http://awealthofcommonsense.com/2016/05/the-sp-500-is-the-worlds-
largest-momentum-strategy/. We see that 40% of all stocks generated no return (while the S&P500 was up
almost 1200% over the same period).
portfolio (ω, 1−ω) of stock and risk-free rate will have an expected return µω = r+ω(µ− r)
and growth rate and volatility γω = r + ω(µ− r)12ω2σ2 and σω = ωσ.
Another interesting observation is that of Jobert et al. (2006) who explain why it is so
rare to achieve the same performance as the mean. Namely, if you observe daily prices for
a stock with annual return and volatility of 20%, then you need about 11 years of data
to provide a confidence interval of ±1% around the estimated volatility of the assumed
underlying stochastic process. Conversely, you require about 1550 years of data to estimate
the return with the same precision.
On the empirical side, it is worth noting just how astonishing the wealth generation of
indexing with only a very small proportion of winners has been for investors. For example,
Bessembinder (2017) analyses the 26, 000 stocks that have entered the CRSP database from
1926 until 2015. He finds that 58% of common stocks have under-performed the T-bill rate
over their full lifetime. Moreover, the entire gain in the U.S. stock-market since 1926 is
attributable to only 4% of the stocks. The top 86 stocks have created a 50% lion-share
of the total $32 trillion dollars achieved. These effects do not seem to be disappearing; for
example, Figure 2 shows a similar effect for the period 1989-2015. For example, the skewness
in individual stock winners such as Amazon which has returned 35, 000% from 1999 versus
181% for the S&P500 index is dramatic. Again, as in the full sample, more than 50% of the
stocks in this period have under-performed cash.
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3 Monte Carlo Simulation
To illustrate our effect, we provide a simple Monte Carlo simulation. We assume a median
index return of 10% and an expected index return of 50% over the considered period T .
We take σ = 20% as a generic annual stock volatility. We choose T = 5 (five years),
µˆ = (log 1.1 + 1
2
0.22 · 5)/5 ≈ 4%, and σˆ = √2 log 1.5− 0.04 · 5 · 2/5 ≈ 13%. We show
the frequency of exceeding or falling short of the expected five year, 500-stock index return
EIN=500T=5 − 1 ≈ 50% when creating sub-portfolios of different sizes (each computed based
on a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 samples). Figure 1 left shows the frequency with
which randomly selected portfolios of a given size overperform (5 year return greater than
50%) and underperform (5 year return less than 50%) the expected return for all 500 stocks.
Figure 1 right shows the frequency with which randomly selected portfolios of a given size
overperform (5 year return greater than 70%) and underperform (5 year return less than
30%) using more extreme thresholds for over- and underperformance.
The risk of substantial index underperformance always dominates the chance of sub-
stantial index outperformance, with the difference being greater the smaller the size of the
selected sub-portfolios. It is far more likely that a randomly selected (small) subset of the
500 stocks will underperform than overperform, because average index performance depends
on the inclusion of the extreme winners that often are missed in sub-portfolios.
4 Conclusion
Researchers have focused on the costs of active management as being primarily the fees paid
for active management (e.g., French 2008). Our model (which is but one way of looking at
the problem) suggests that the much higher cost of active management may be the inher-
ently high chance of underperformance that comes with attempts to select stocks, since stock
selection itself increases the chance of underperformance relative to the chance of overperfor-
mance in many circumstances. To the extent that those allocating assets have assumed that
the only cost of active investing above indexing is the cost of the active manager in fees, that
assumption should be revisited. Active managers do not start out on an even playing field
with passive investing. Rather, active managers must overcome an inherent disadvantage.
The stakes for identifying the best active managers may be higher than previously thought.
Put another way, passive investing may have a larger head start on active investing than
previously believed. When creating a portfolio combining passive and active strategies,
independently of past performance, return estimation should be adjusted for the inherent
statistical disadvantage of the active manager combined with their higher fees.
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